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Abstract 
Evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) represents a paradigm shift in the understanding of the 
ontogenesis and evolutionary progression of the denizens of the natural world. Given the empirical 
successes of the evo-devo framework, and its now widespread acceptance, a timely and important task 
for the philosophy of biology is to critically discern the ontological commitments of that framework and 
assess whether and to what extent our current metaphysical models are able to accommodate them. In 
this paper, I argue that one particular model is a natural fit: an ontology of dispositional properties coherently 
and adequately captures the crucial casual-cum-explanatory role that the fundamental elements of evo-
devo play within that framework. 
 
The recent advent of evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) has ushered in a novel conception 
of the organism and its place in the biological world, one which has substantially built upon the 
theoretical framework of the Modern Synthesis by offering new perspectives on the nature of both 
ontogenesis and evolution. In contrast to the crude reductionism of genocentrism, evo-devo places emergent, 
epigenetic, environmentally-sensitive causal factors at the explanatory centre of morphogenesis. And 
although population-level, allele frequency-based explanations are no doubt explanatory with respect to 
the evolutionary process of natural selection, evo-devo‟s unique focus on the developmental mechanisms 
which intrinsically constrain and shape morphology paints a colourful and powerful new picture of that 
process. Given the potential gestalt-shift inherent in the framework of evo-devo, it is instructive now to 
reflect on whether and to what extent our current philosophical concepts are able to coherently and 
adequately model that framework and its accompanying empirical and experimental data – a question that 
has yet to be given serious philosophical attention.1 What I want to suggest is that capturing the ontology of 
evo-devo is a task that ought to be performed by putting to service the contemporary philosophical 
framework of dispositional properties. My claim is that the integrated causal-cum-explanatory role that the 
elements central to the framework of evo-devo play with respect to ontogenesis and evolutionary 
progression is one that is adequately and sufficiently captured by the theoretical nature of dispositional 
properties. Evo-devo is, or so I will argue, a science of dispositions.  
 
1. A Contemporary Conception of Dispositional Properties  
In order to substantiate that claim, we‟ll need to first have a firm grip on the nature of dispositional 
properties. Of course, given the size of the contemporary literature on dispositions, there is quite a lot of 
variation in the particulars here – but rather than comparing and contrasting the merits of various specific 
accounts, what I want to do below is to draw out a few of what I consider the most important and 
defining features of these properties, ones which I think, for all practical purposes, function as the 
“lowest common denominator” features of a wide-variety of more specialised accounts.2 Getting clear on 
                                                     
1 Though there has been some interesting recent work on applying a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics of the sort on 
offer here to the realm of biology – see Walsh (2006) and Boulter (2012). 
2 Of course, this is only a general overview, or summation which itself takes in to account a vast amount of recent 
literature – readers are encouraged to consult the accompanying footnotes for further details and discussion.  
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these core features is a necessary first step, for these features, as I will go on to argue, are precisely the 
ones which we find in the properties which comprise the core ontology of evo-devo. 
Dispositional properties are commonly understood as intrinsically causal properties, responsible 
for the production of particular states of affairs („manifestation states‟) upon the occurrence of another 
precursive state of affairs („stimulus conditions‟). For dispositional realists, the causal nature of these 
properties is often characterised in contrast with „categorical‟ properties: while the latter are taken to be 
intrinsically inert, being supposedly imbued with their causal oomph in virtue of participating in higher-
order natural laws (as exhibited in Armstrong 1997), or else in virtue of their relation to sets of (abstract 
or concrete) possible worlds (as exhibited in Lewis 1986), dispositional realists have traditionally 
understood those properties to be the real sources of power in the world in virtue of their being intrinsically 
causal.3 They are so in virtue of their acting as ontological “switches” of sorts, causally mediating the 
influence of the latter states to bring about the former ones. In the philosophy of physics for instance, the 
property „negative charge‟ is commonly taken to be a dispositional property – when its bearers meet a 
like-charged particle (its stimulus condition), they repel with a certain momentum (its manifestation state). 
This is a causal role, according to dispositional realists, which is intrinsic, or “of the nature” of „negative 
charge‟. Importantly, while dispositional properties in “fundamental” ontologies may be realised by 
solitary material elements, most of these properties are realised by an entire system, comprised of a 
complex network of interacting elements: whenever, upon the occurrence of a particular set of 
conditions, such a network initiates a series of step-wise internodal causal connectives which lead to its 
production of a particular end state, that network realises a dispositional property.4 
In this way, dispositional properties are functionally defined with respect to their specific 
stimulus/manifestation pairs: whatever performs the function of causally mediating the occurrence of a 
particular manifestation state upon the occurrence of a particular stimulus conditions is an instance of the 
dispositional property defined by that specific pair.5 It‟s important to note that when we designate a 
structure as an instance of a functionally defined property, we are operating at a certain level of 
abstraction, eschewing the more precise details of the causal pathway by which that function is carried out 
and focusing instead on the general end states between which that pathway runs.6 Thus, when a system 
realises a particular dispositional property, the pathway from „stimulus‟ to „manifestation‟ often “reaches 
over” a multi-stage causal gap – and we are afforded evidence of the existence of such properties when 
these gaps are reliably and repeatedly bridged upon the occurrence of a set of appropriate conditions. 
 In this abstraction, we not only shift the focus away from the particulars of the pathway between 
those end states – that is, the various links comprising the causal chain between those states – but also the 
various particular ways in which that pathway might be traversed. And given that there is a multitude of 
distinct instances of a particular type of stimulus condition which will lead to a multitude of distinct 
instances of a particular type of manifestation state, it is generally accepted that a dispositional property 
                                                     
3 For some good representations of this ideological contrast, see Ellis (2001), Bird (2007), Chakravartty (2007), 
Mumford & Anjum (2011), Vetter (2015).  
4 Note that the philosopher‟s paragon of dispositionality – the property of „fragility‟ – is realised (in most cases) by a 
complex microstructure, and „breaking‟ is in fact a complex, multi-stage process featuring the aligning of various 
micro-events that represent decreasing degrees of structural integrity. 
5 Understanding dispositions to be „functionally individuated‟ arose from their initial attempted reduction to 
subjunctive conditionals (especially counterfactuals), prominent in Quine (1974) and later, in Lewis‟ (1997) „simple 
conditional analysis‟. However, even for the contemporary dispositional realist who decisively eschews this 
reductionist project, those properties are nevertheless understood as being essentially characterised functionally, 
roughly in terms of their „antecedents‟ and „consequents‟. 
6 Oftentimes in the process of scientific discovery, operating at that level of abstraction is obligatory, as we have yet 
to uncover the underlying mechanistic configurations which causally connect pairs of end-states. Arguably, our 
ability to identify causal structures at this level is a prerequisite for the success of that process, given that scientific 
progress often consists in the discovery of such mechanisms. 
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must be defined by two states which are determinables, not determinates: for a system realising a disposition is 
capable of producing an extensive, gradient-like range of quantitatively distinct manifestation states – each 
being a particular instance of its manifestation type – in response to its receiving a variety of specific 
stimulus inputs. In this way, the activity of dispositional properties is best described functionally, as their 
existence establishes a functional relation between a set of input values, or particular determinate 
instances of determinable stimulus conditions, and a set of output values, or particular determinate 
instances of determinable manifestation states.7 To put it in another, perhaps more careful way: 
dispositional properties are responsible for establishing a causal link of functional co-variance of state-values 
between two determinable end states.8 
 Because they are responsible for the reliable and repeatable production of particular end states, 
dispositions are commonly understood as teleological, goal-directed properties – ones which are causally 
“directed toward”, or for those ends. Although the “directedness” of these properties has at times been 
seen as an unwanted appropriation of an unviable form of physical intentionality, or as requiring those 
properties to bear proper relations to non-existent states of affairs, for the dispositional realist, nothing so 
mysterious is happening here.9 As these are properties defined by what they do, a dispositional property‟s 
having a particular „goal‟ of bringing about a specific event is simply tantamount to it being the property 
primarily (causally) responsible for bringing that event about (under certain circumstances); thus the 
reader may substitute Mayr‟s (1992) „teleonomic‟ for „teleological‟ here, if one understands dispositions as 
intrinsically “programmed” via their functional role. For a certain class of dispositional properties 
however, their teleological character is exhibited in a stronger sense, in that the systems which realise 
these properties are oftentimes capable of exhibiting the phenomenon of persistence, maintaining the 
production of a particular end state “as a result of changes occurring in the system that compensate for 
any disturbances taking place (provided these are not too great) either within or [external] to the system, 
disturbances which, were there no compensating changes elsewhere, would prevent the realisation of the 
[end state]”.10 This process of “course correcting” towards a particular end state is characteristic of the 
causal process initiated and mediated by dispositional properties present in biological systems, and it is 
one which occurs in a systematic and non-accidental fashion, over a wide range of perturbations.11 
On account of both the functional nature of these properties – with respect both to their 
individuation and their activity – and their goal-directedness, dispositions are often categorised as multiply 
realisable properties, being importantly “disassociated” from the particularities of the underlying causal 
systems which comprise them.12 Because they are functionally individuated, whichever such system reliably 
and repeatedly traverses their particular pathway from stimulus to manifestation constitutes the 
„realisation‟ of those properties – thus, many distinct underlying systems may realise one and the same 
dispositional property. Furthermore, due to their functional activity (captured by their establishing a 
relation of causal co-variance of state-values), no particular causal pathway through any one of those 
                                                     
7 This fact is what has come to be known as dispositions being “multi-track”. See Martin (2008), Manley and 
Wasserman (2008), and Vetter (2013) for fuller discussions. 
8 This is the relation that Lewis (2000: 190) called „causal influence‟, which is the foundation of Woodward‟s (2003; 
2010) influential „manipulation‟ theory of causation. 
9 That dispositional properties do exhibit a type of „physical intentionality‟ was originally defended by Place (1996), 
and more recently by Molnar (2003) and Mumford & Anjum (2011). For a prominent critique, see Armstrong 
(1997). 
10 Nagel (1977: 272) 
11 See Walsh (2012), and Mayr (1992) 
12 The multiple realisability of dispositions is often expressed by defining them as properties which have their „causal 
roles‟ essentially, thus distinguishing them from their „categorical bases‟ – see Ellis (2001), Cross (2005), and Bird 
(2007). This conception has often been utilised in arguments against their genuine causal efficacy - though see 
McKitrick (2005) for a detailed reply to these sorts of criticisms.  
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distinct systems defines a particular dispositional property – thus, many distinct underlying causal graphs of 
the same system will realise one and the same dispositional property. The same point applies with respect 
to their goal-directedness and the accompanying phenomenon of persistence, due to the underlying causal 
architecture which realises a particular dispositional property being capable of various “course-correcting” 
alterations. Dispositions are therefore in this sense explanatorily emergent – although they may be 
ontologically “nothing over and above” the various causal networks (and variations thereof) which realise 
them, they cannot be strictly identified with any particular such network.13  
 
2. The Central Ontology of Evo-Devo: Developmental Modules 
Now that we‟ve got a grip on the core features of dispositional properties – their functional individuation 
and activity, their goal-directedness, and their multiple realisability – it‟s time to examine the precise place 
at which I‟d like to put them to work in a biological context. My claim is that these properties are present 
in what I consider the central ontological elements of evo-devo – „developmental modules‟. In order to 
show that this is indeed the case, let us look at what developmental modules are, and what role they play 
within evo-devo.  
 The foundation of the evo-devo framework consists in the theoretical integration of the 
principles of ontogenesis with the process of natural selection: in this framework, understanding the 
causal structure of organismal development is central to understanding the mechanism of evolution. Because 
the course of evolution is charted via the phylogenetic tracing of the appearance of novel morphological 
structures among populations, the discipline of evo-devo is concerned with specifying what the causal 
ground of particular morphological structures is, as well as the mechanisms by which novelty among such 
structures arises. Although the specific answers to these questions will be different in different cases, the 
general picture that evo-devo paints is that the ontogenesis of organisms is ontologically divided in to 
discrete sets of systems – developmental modules - each responsible for the development of a particular 
(structural) morphological feature (e.g. eyes, fins, wings, etc.) - and that it is these systems‟ intrinsic 
generative capacities which are causally responsible for providing the morphological novelty which 
subsequently shapes the evolutionary (read: selective) landscape.  
 Developmental modules are often epistemically identified with respect to particular genetic 
regulatory networks (GRNs) which consist of a hierarchical set of genes, their transcriptional products, their 
cross-regulatory interactions, and their interactions with epigenetic factors, whose “intrinsic behaviours 
and functional interactions yield a mechanistic explanation of an identifiable developmental process or 
transformation”.14 The GRNs which are taken to comprise developmental modules contain multiple 
interacting sub-circuits, each of which play distinct roles within the overall network with respect to the 
production of its associated morphological structure – minimally, each module consists of a sub-circuit 
whose products exert (spatial and temporal) regulatory control over the expression of a downstream 
target gene battery whose products specify cell-type fate, and are thus responsible for the actual 
“building” of a particular morphological structure.15 These sub-systems function in a unified fashion with 
respect to the production of discrete morphological features in virtue of their particularly high degree of 
internal integration via the inter-module functional cooperation of their parts – that is, via the tightly-knit 
regulatory domain established by their elements‟ transcription factors, corresponding cis-regulatory sites 
and their resultant signalling cascade (Erwin & Davidson 2009), as evidenced by the analysis of their 
expression patterns (Raff & Sly 2000). 
                                                     
13 For a good discussion of „explanatory‟ vs. „ontological‟ emergence, see Walsh (2013). 
14 Von Dassow & Munro (1999: 313) 
15 The former sub-circuit has been recently referred to as a network „kernel‟ (Davidson & Erwin 2006), „core 
regulatory network‟ (Graf & Enver 2009), or „character identity network‟ (Wagner 2007; 2014) 
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 On account of these networks‟ being highly internally integrated, they are also highly robust, such 
that intra-species mutational variations among their component elements, and epigenetic variations on 
their regulatory structure generally have little to no effect on their generative competence with respect to 
their resultant morphological structure (Davidson 2001; Carroll 2008; Wagner & Lynch 2010). Typically, 
these networks are robust not merely in virtue of simply possessing a number of „redundant‟ elements 
(gained perhaps through various duplication events), but on account of their ability to maintain their 
generative integrity (with respect to their associated morphological structure) by “re-wiring” their 
regulatory architecture such that certain non-isomorphic elements (elements that have distinct structural 
compositions) are able to become isofunctional (playing the same function within the system) – this is the 
phenomenon of degeneracy, now thought to be ubiquitous in the biological realm (Greenspan 2001; Mason 
2010), and a sine quo non of developmental systems‟ ability to evolve (Edelman & Gally 2001; Whitacre & 
Bender 2010).16   
Working in concert, these integrated and robust sub-systems compose the regulatory architecture 
of individual developmental modules which are causally responsible for the specified production of 
individual morphological structures within the ontogenesis of a particular taxon, evidence for which is 
gathered from ectopic expression experiments17, or else by the principled decomposition of genotype-
phenotype mappings.18 They are able to do so because, being highly internally integrated and generatively 
robust, these modules are likewise „generatively entrenched‟ at very crucial points within the 
developmental “program” (Raff 1996; Schank & Wimsatt 2000), functioning as informational 
intermediaries situated between a set of embryonically internal intra- and inter-cellular upstream signals 
and the downstream expression of a multitude of proteins that determine cellular differentiation and 
morphogenetic competence within a particular „morphogenetic field‟. In this way, developmental modules 
form the bottleneck of the „developmental hourglass‟ where the sands of a wide variety of input signals 
are sifted through their narrow gates in a specialised fall among a diverse set of target genes (Galis & Metz 
2001; Kalinka et al. 2010). As mediators of the flow of regulatory information, developmental modules 
operate to effectively translate “…the „abstract‟ positional information of early development into specific 
developmental individuality by controlling character-specific gene expression”.19 It is because they 
function as crucial causal fulcrums in the process of the ontogenesis of particular morphogenetic 
structures that developmental modules are central to the discipline of evo-devo: they are the naturally 
dissectible, discrete units which direct the development of organisms.  
 This central developmental position which these modules occupy not only grants them a certain 
stability, captured by their generative robustness as described above, but also a corresponding and 
complementary degree of flexibility – for the nature of their constitutive regulatory architecture, and their 
occupation of the developmental bottleneck of ontogenesis allows them to function as an important 
ground of variation with respect to their associated phenotypic traits. Indeed, one of the fundamental 
posits of the evo-devo framework is the existence of stable developmental resources whose inherent 
plasticity is the causal ground of such variation.20 In a notable shift from the neo-Darwinian perspective, 
                                                     
16 This phenomenon is the ground of Dynamic Systems Theory‟s conceptualisation of the morphological structures 
associated with such modules as „attractor states‟ which carve-out a wide, „meta-network‟ basin in the topology of an 
organism‟s epigenetic landscape. See §4.  
17 This technique was especially prominent in Halder et al. (1995);  For a general contemporary review in a particular 
case, see Ashery-Padan & Gruss (2001). 
18 See Wagner & Altenberg (1996) 
19 Wagner (2014: 98) 
20 The extreme conservation of HOX-genes (and their associated networks) within the animal kingdom is perhaps 
the most prominent, and extreme instance of this general phenomenon. See Carroll, Grenier, and Weatherbee 
(2001), and Wilkins (2002) for excellent summaries. 
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evo-devo favours a „structuralist‟ approach21, wherein intra-kind phenotypic diversity is understood to be 
underwritten by a common set of developmental resources which themselves constrain and specify the 
variability of their associated morphological structures according to their own “generative rules”.22 
For we now know that the morphological structure produced by a single developmental module, 
being underwritten by a particular genetic regulatory network, is capable of a wide variety of intra- and 
inter-cellular environmentally induced phenotypic variation - this is the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity, 
attested to by the reality (read: quantifiability) of reaction norms (Pigliucci 2001; West-Eberhard 2003). As 
we have seen, on account of the unique developmental position of these modules, they function as causal 
mediators of sorts, interpreting cascades of upstream “inputs” into downstream “outputs” via their 
production of transcription factors which enact regulatory control at the cis-regulatory sites of 
downstream target genes (Gurdon & Bourillot 2001; Tabata 2001; Mann & Carroll 2002). As a result, 
heterochronical and heteropical alterations in upstream signalling results in downstream qualitative 
alterations (shape, size, pigmentation, etc.) of the phenotypic character of the structure generated by that 
module (Schlichting & Smith 2002; Aubin-Horth & Renn 2009). 
Thus, the morphological structure generatively specified by a single developmental module 
consists of a definite range of variations on that structure – specifying a demarcated morphospace of these 
permutations – and so must in a certain sense be “defined by its variational tendencies”23, or its set of 
“developmental trajectories, [correlated with] the particular set of environmental conditions to which [it] 
is exposed”24, in such a way that it represents, as Love (2009: 57) puts it, “an idealised type…constructed 
from ample and acknowledged variation”.25 The discovery that the intra-species stability of developmental 
modules undergirds the ability for phenotypic flexibility puts those modules at the centre of the evo-devo 
project – for if developmental constraints are best thought of as limiting cases of developmental possibilities, 
these modules and their properties may be the ontological basis for evolvability, as the raw material upon 
which the various processes of natural selection operate (Kirschner & Gerhart 2006; Brigandt 2007; 
Brakefield 2011; McCune & Schimenti 2012). 
 
3. Development, Dispositionally   
As I have shown, according to the theoretical framework of evo-devo, developmental modules occupy an 
importantly privileged position in virtue of their playing an integrated causal-cum-explanatory role with 
respect to the ontogenesis of organisms and the process of evolution. The claim of this paper, and what I 
shall now show, is that this is a role adequately and sufficiently captured by the theoretical nature of 
dispositional properties – namely, their functional individuation and activity, their multiple realisability, 
and their goal-directedness. 
  More specifically, the claim I want to make is that developmental modules are dispositional properties.26 
As we have seen, the developmental modules of evo-devo are causally responsible for the specified 
production of their associated morphological structures in developing organisms in virtue of their serving 
as a functional bridge between intra- and inter-cellular signalling and specific downstream genetic 
expression patterns which initiate particularised developmental pathways resulting in the formation of 
                                                     
21 See Amundson (2005) for an excellent in-depth discussion of the „structuralist‟ paradigm and its relation to that of 
the Modern Synthesis. 
22 Cf. Müller (2008) 
23 Von Dassow & Munro (1999: 316) 
24 Pigliucci et al. (1996: 81) 
25 In developmental systems theory, this is modeled by stating that “equivalent [modules] share an equivalent 
topology of their phase and configuration spaces” (Jaeger & Sharpe 2014: 73). See §4. 
26 It should be noted that while this general claim has been made before – namely, by Wagner (2000) and Eble 
(2005)– , it has yet to receive a philosophically precise treatment. 
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those structures. These modules therefore function as ontological “switches”, causally mediating the 
influence of certain activating conditions to produce particular states of affairs: given the appropriate 
stimulus conditions, developmental modules reliably and repeatable produce particular end states. Thus, 
these modules‟ characteristic activity is appropriately “higher-order”, after the fashion of dispositional 
properties – that is, at a certain level of abstraction, away from the various complexities of the 
aforementioned particularities: operating at a high „causality horizon‟ (Salazar-Ciudad & Jernvall 2013), the 
important activity of these modules can be usefully modelled with respect to their mediating the “reach” 
over a wide, multi-stage causal gap from a particular set of stimuli toward a particular end state.  
Recall that on account of their aforementioned roles as causal mediators between upstream 
signalling pathways and downstream target genes, the generative competence of developmental modules 
consists not only in their being responsible for the intra-specific development of a particular 
morphological structure, but also in their being responsible for various intra-specific (qualitative and 
quantitative) permutations on that structure. Because the causal pathway between upstream intra- and 
inter-cellular signals and downstream “trait-building” genes is one which can be traversed in many distinct 
ways (according to the variability in those upstream signals), a single module must be conceptualised as 
responsible for the specified production of an entire reaction norm consisting of a wide range of 
environmentally correlated variations on its associated morphological structure, defining a morphospace 
with respect to that structure. Thus, in any particular instance, in “interpreting” specific collections of a 
generalised class of upstream positional signals into specific forms of a generalised downstream 
morphogenetic state, these modules are responsible for mediating the causal co-variance of determinate 
state-values between two determinable variables. Accordingly, their functional activity in this respect ensures 
that no single developmental module is capable of being defined by any particular causal pathway through 
any one of its distinct upstream-downstream mappings. 
Indeed, in the contemporary literature, it is the performance of this important higher-order 
functional role which has taken centre stage in the study of developmental modules. Because attempting to 
define any particular module with a specific set of genetic elements has proven an unfruitful endeavour, the 
focus has largely shifted to conceptualising these modules as centres of generative, rather than genetic 
specificity (Rieppel 2005; Love 2009; Brigdandt 2009). For while it‟s undeniable that tracing the 
particularities of repeated genetic architectural themes throughout evolutionary time has led to incredibly 
important insights in establishing molecular-based phylogenetic lineages, the aforementioned 
phenomenon of degenerative robustness ensures the existence of multiple variations in the regulatory 
architecture responsible for the production of a single, specific morphological structure.27 In other words, 
over time, and in successive generations, the specific generative role once played by a particular complex 
of genetic elements in a particular regulatory configuration becomes autonomised, gaining a kind of (at least 
partial) independence from its original underlying architecture.28  
As a consequence of this, any particular developmental module must be conceptually 
“disassociated” from any single, specific underlying networked mechanism and its constitutive processes: 
though for every particular module (and its associated morphological structure) we may be able to 
experimentally demarcate a meta-network of such mechanisms, we cannot strictly identify that module 
with any single member of that meta-network. I suggest then that a natural way to philosophically 
characterise the “hierarchical disconnect” (Ereshefsky 2012) between generative function and genetic 
structure that results from the degenerative robustness of developmental systems is via the metaphysical 
distinction between disposition and realiser. In other words, the fact that many distinct underlying regulatory 
                                                     
27 It‟s worth mentioning that some interesting and exciting new work suggests that there may be “core” GRNs 
which function as evolutionarily conserved sub-system bases of developmental modules; see Wagner (2007; 2014), 
Davidson & Erwin (2006), and Graf & Enver (2009). 
28 See Müller & Newman (1999), Müller (2003), and Hall (2003) for particular examples. 
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genomic structures lead reliably and repeatedly to the same „epigenetic valley‟ in intra-specific 
morphospace, and thus play the same functional role with respect to the production of a particular 
morphological trait-type, suggests that these varied and distinct structures all instantiate a common 
higher-order, functionally defined property – that is, a single, multiply realised dispositional property. Thus, 
as Rieppel (2005: 25) puts it, it seems that “…the best way to capture „developmental modules‟ is as 
homeostatic property cluster natural kinds with causal properties that are instantiated by individuals” 
which perform a generative function “…through the tokens that instantiate their causal properties and 
propensities”.29    
 If then we understand developmental modules as multiply realised dispositional properties which 
are functionally individuated with respect to their end-states (that is, the set of variationally-related 
morphological structures comprising its morphospace), we can conceptualise the ability of their 
underlying genetic networks to “re-wire” their regulatory architecture in the face of perturbation in order 
to main their generative integrity as a display of the dispositional, teleological phenomenon of persistence. 
Importantly, this is a goal-directedness with respect to a causal end-state, not a historical function, and 
thus represents a phenomenon orthogonal to the teleosemanticism now prevalent in the adapationist 
paradigm30: modelling this phenomenon does not require any theoretical measurement of these networks‟ 
storied, selected-effect fitness-contributions, but rather an appeal to the univocal causal focus of large 
genomic „meta-networks‟ comprising wide ranges of intra-specific mutational and regulatory variation 
(Newman et al. 2006; Carroll 2008; Wagner & Lynch 2010). Thus, if we conceptualise dispositional 
modules as dispositional properties, we can understand the association of a particular module with a 
demarcated set of meta-networks as a consequence of the teleological activity of their commonly realised, 
higher-order dispositional property.31 
All of this goes to show that the main pillars of the conceptual framework provided by an 
ontology of dispositional properties – functional individuation and activity, multiple realisability, and goal-
directedness – are quite naturally applicable in the contemporary realm of evolutionary developmental 
biology. Importantly however, the central ontological elements of evo-devo are not merely plausibly 
amenable to a general dispositional redescription - as I hope is now clear, the integral theoretical role that 
developmental modules play within evo-devo just is a dispositional role. For serving as the functionally 
individuated, causally robust ground of determinable state co-variance in virtue of occupying a privileged 
position as the functional intermediaries connecting the wider, top and bottom ends of the developmental 
bottleneck of ontogenesis, and so being generatively responsible for the downstream production of a 
demarcated structural morphospace is at the core of developmental modules‟ ability to effectively provide 
a platform for both developmental and evolutionary stability and variation.  
 
4. A Powerful Payoff: The Prowess of Higher-Order Holism 
Thus far I have argued that the metaphysical framework of dispositional properties is an empirically 
adequate one, inherently capable of accurately capturing the relevant phenomenon at the conceptual core 
                                                     
29 Cf. Boyd (1999) and Wilson et al. (2007). 
30 Cf.  Winther (2005), and Von Dassow & Munro (1999) 
31 The claim that developmental modules are dispositional properties is likely to cause some pause, as „module‟ 
naturally functions as an entity-term, rather than a property-term. While I‟m sympathetic to this reticence, consider that 
the above discussion is meant to motivate the idea that, due to the genetic and regulatory variation in the entities 
which are causally responsible for the generation of morphological structures over both developmental and 
evolutionary time-scales, „modules‟ must be defined at an ontologically “higher-level” than those entities. With that 
in mind, conceptualising „modules‟ as dispositional properties that are variably realized by those variously distinct 
collections of entities seems, within the current state of the existing literature, the easiest and most economical way 
to accommodate that idea. That said, if the reader wishes to replace „dispositional property‟ with „dispositional 
entity‟, I can‟t see that anything essential will be lost in translation. 
This is a pre-print version of Evo-Devo: A Science of Dispositions, European Journal for Philosophy of Science  (forthcoming). 
The final publication will be available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s13194-016-0166-9 
9 
 
of the theoretical project of evo-devo. Importantly of course, it‟s one thing for a proposed framework to 
save the phenomenon, and quite another for it to explain it. And while the former task is certainly a 
prerequisite for its plausibility, the extent to which it performs the latter directly apprises its theoretical 
utility, and thus often, its desirability. With that in mind, what I want to now show is the way in which the 
conceptual framework of dispositional properties performs that latter task in virtue of its natural capacity 
to serve as the metaphysical foundation of a few now prominent conceptual tools in our wider 
understanding of the causal architecture of developmental sub-systems. The explanatory power of that 
framework, I suggest, consists in the fact that the positing of the presence of its uniquely natured 
properties within those sub-systems functions as a sufficiently robust explanation for the theoretical 
viability of a number of now prominent models of those systems‟ causal structure. This is an explanatory 
prowess revealed, as it were, transcendentally, in that the distinctive features of that framework‟s ontology 
effectively function as the metaphysical preconditions for the tenability of those models. 
 To illustrate this, I want to focus on a central feature of the nature of dispositional properties as 
explicated above – their functional individuation. Recall that dispositions are metaphysically individuated 
according to a particular „causal role‟ in such a way that the existence of any specific disposition just is a 
matter of some element, or complex of elements establishing a specified link of functional co-variance of 
state-values between two determinable end states. Accordingly, as “higher-order” properties, dispositions 
are multiply realisable in such a way that two systems comprised of distinct sets of elements can realise one 
and the same dispositional property in virtue of their performing the same functional role which defines 
that property. In the previous section, I argued that developmental modules can be understood as 
dispositional properties, defined via their higher-order generative role with respect to a particular 
morphospace and multiply realised by a meta-network of GRNs connected via mutational and regulatory 
architectural permutations. What I want to claim now is that conceptualising developmental systems in 
this way allows us to accurately and adequately model the ontological commitments of an increasingly 
important concept in our understanding of the mechanisms of evo-devo – namely, the phenomenon of 
emergence, and the associated causal and explanatory import of holistic, structural features of developmental 
systems.  
 Although the reductionist rule of the mechanistic magisterium has now long been established in 
the biological sciences and has provided us with innumerable invaluable insights into both the process of 
development and of evolution, there is a burgeoning trend in the field of evo-devo which heralds a 
substantial refocus on the holistic features of developmental systems as both causally central and 
explanatorily indispensable with respect to those processes.32 Indeed, a holistic conception of organisms 
and their developmental sub-systems, itself once much maligned as being irrevocably wedded to the failed 
project of vitalism, is now a prominent feature of many evo-devo frameworks.33 Within these frameworks, 
the higher-order functions of developmental systems are understood as novel, emergent features “arising” from 
the elemental collections which compose those systems (Wimsatt 2000; Callebaut et al. 2007; Mitchell 
2012; Walsh 2013; Brigandt 2015), and are accredited with playing a causal-cum-explanatory role within 
the process of development which is irreducibly unique, insofar as its dynamic features are attributable to 
these systems only qua holistic structures (Boogerd et al. 2005; Huneman 2010; Nathan 2012; Salazar-
Ciudad & Jernvall 2013). 
A particularly striking and notable instance of the operation of this framework in a contemporary 
context is found in dynamic systems theory (DST), a project begun in spirit by Waddington‟s (1957) posit of 
                                                     
32 Interestingly, in contemporary philosophy of physics, metaphysical frameworks for interpreting key phenomena in 
quantum mechanics – esp. non-locality and entanglement – have also taken the “holistic turn”. See Morganti (2009) 
and Ney (2015) for some prominent recent expressions. 
33 For a comprehensive review of the holistic principles of the vitalism movement and their clash with the „new 
philosophy of mechanism‟, see Allen (2005) and Nicholson (2012). 
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an „epigenetic landscape‟, and subsequently fleshed-out with insights from Kaufmann‟s (1969) Boolean 
modelling of GRNs (Wang et al. 2011; Huang 2012). DST, as a novel modelling technique of 
developmental systems, has afforded researchers a set of unique conceptual resources with which to 
understand the process of development, and is now rather widely applied in analyses of everything from 
sub-organismal cell-fate (Bhattacharya et al. 2011; Verd et al. 2014) to the evolvability of organism 
populations (Striedter 1998; Jaeger & Monk 2014).34 The defining feature of DST is its geometric 
modelling of the activity of developmental systems as a kinetic traversal across the topological curvatures 
of an epigenetic landscape (Wang et al. 2011; Huang 2012; Davila-Velderrain et al. 2015). On DST, the 
state of a developmental system is conceptualised as a frictionless orb, and the temporal succession of 
various distinct states of that system throughout the performance of its causal function are understood as 
the dynamic trajectory of that orb through a pathway geometrically constrained by the topological ridges 
and valleys of the system‟s Boolean regulatory configuration. 
In this framework, a developmental system‟s morphological end-state is conceptualised as an 
attractor whose wide basin of attraction dynamically constrains the system‟s various causal trajectories to 
follow a pathway within the sloping walls of its surrounding topology. Thus it is the higher-order, formal 
properties of a developmental system – that is, the character of the topology defined by its Boolean 
network connectives – which are explanatory with respect to why that system reaches a particular end-
state: the dynamics of attractor states (and their metric-bending basins) possess the relevant causal-cum-
explanatory power. In contrast, the system‟s non-formal properties – that is, the other characteristics of 
whatever underlying mechanistic elements to which those Boolean values belong – are explanatorily 
irrelevant, as one and the same structural topology, defined by a “pattern of activity” or a dynamic 
tendency toward a particular end-state via a specific landscape, can be instantiated by any number of 
distinct sets of underlying constituents composing distinct GRNs (Gilbert & Bolker 2001; Dupré 2013; 
Jaeger & Monk 2015).  
On a more general and wide-reaching scale, the theoretical focus on the emergent, higher-order 
activity of developmental systems has also been central to the recently prominent rise of process ontology. 
According to this revisionary framework, as Dupré (2013: 30) puts it, “[w]hat are stable and robust in 
biology are not things, but processes”. 35 For the advocates of process ontology, while well-defined sets of 
mechanisms play an important explanatory role in ontogenesis, it is the higher-order processes instantiated 
by developmental systems, defined by their directive activity with respect to the developmental generation, 
and homeostatic maintenance of, a particular morphological trait which are to be metaphysically 
privileged.36 This is because although a single morphological feature cannot be strictly identified as being 
generatively specified by any single GRN (due to the aforementioned phenomenon of degenerative 
robustness), the entire collection of networks which are causally responsible for that feature do share 
something important in common – namely, their instantiation of a higher-order, productive (and 
preservative) activity with respect to that trait (Brigandt 2007; Rosa & Exteberria 2011; Dupré 2013; Jaeger 
& Monk 2015). Thus, from the perspective of process ontology, it is the emergent, dynamically directive 
activities of developmental systems which are the explanatorily central and ontologically stable entities in 
the biological realm. 
 To return now to the bigger picture, the point I want to make with respect to both the general 
and specific application of the holistic framework – represented here by process ontology and DST 
                                                     
34 There are now several journals devoted to „dynamic approaches‟ to biological modelling – for instance Molecular 
Systems Biology and BMC Systems Biology. 
35 Cf. Woese‟s (2004) clarion call for a process perspective in his “A New Biology for a New Century”. 
36 Process ontology is closely related to organicism, another once disregard theory which is now gaining some traction 
among systems biologists which embraces a framework of holism. See Gilbert & Sarkar (2000) for a comprehensive 
introductory overview. 
This is a pre-print version of Evo-Devo: A Science of Dispositions, European Journal for Philosophy of Science  (forthcoming). 
The final publication will be available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/s13194-016-0166-9 
11 
 
respectively – is that the plausibility, and subsequent viability of returning anew to this understanding of 
developmental systems by granting that the higher-order features of those systems play an important 
explanatory role with respect to the process of development ultimately depends, philosophically, upon 
one‟s metaphysics‟ ability to countenance those features with ontological sincerity. What I want to suggest 
then is that the theoretical advantageousness and empirically predictive success of these frameworks are 
phenomena best explained by positing the existence of higher-order, functionally-individuated, multiply 
realisable dispositional properties. In other words: the unique explanatory prowess of the higher-order, 
structural models that these frameworks utilise only makes sense if, and is most plausible under the 
supposition that, those structures have a proper metaphysical underpinning - and an ontological inventory 
of dispositional properties provides just that. 
Consider, for instance, what the world must be like – metaphysically – if the higher-order „epigenetic 
landscapes‟ of developmental systems are to be properly explanatory with respect to the process of 
ontogenesis, as posited by DST. An epigenetic landscape, defined by a functionally-specified topology 
whose emergent hills and valleys are “carved out” by the dynamic potential of various temporal transitions 
among a system‟s state-values, reflects a system‟s developmental constraints as causal correlations which 
hold between its initial and final state. Granting these topologies explanatory weight then suggests that we 
are required to conceptualise the GRNs of developmental systems as instantiating a single, though initial-
value sensitive higher-order relation of causal correlations which determine their developmental state 
transitions – that is, as realising a single, “multi-track” dispositional property, defined by its functional 
relation of causal influence which holds among particular stimuli and variations on its manifestation type. 
The claim here is simple: if the „creods‟ which define the curvatures of the topology of an epigenetic 
landscape of a developmental system are to represent genuinely explanatory generative constraints, those 
causally entrenched pathways had better be robustly captured by our ontology. And because this particular 
form of causal privileging is inherent in the very nature of dispositions, I suggest that taking the 
explanatory project of DST metaphysically seriously requires positing the existence of such properties. 
Consider next what the world must be like – metaphysically – if developmental systems are best 
understood as stabilised instances of higher-order, holistic dynamic structures, as advocated by the 
defenders of process ontology. Because developmental systems are capable of undergoing various 
alterations in a wide range of their underlying architectural GRN configurations and yet retaining an 
unchanging dynamic orientation toward the production and maintenance of their associated 
morphological features, advocates of a process ontology grant these dynamic structures metaphysical 
prominence in functioning as the defining features of those systems. If we are to reconceptualise 
developmental systems as higher-order dynamic structures which are capable of being underpinned by a 
variety of distinct mechanistic configurations, we are seemingly required to posit the existence of 
repeatable, functionally individuated causal profiles which have a certain amount of autonomy over and 
above the particularities of the varied networks which satisfy them. Indeed, if these holistic dynamic 
structures are to properly carve the biological world “at the joints”, our ontology had better be capable of 
granting them the metaphysical weight that job requires. I suggest that this is a requirement easily met by 
positing that various distinct mechanistic configurations are capable of instantiating a single, higher-order, 
multiply realisable dispositional property, defined by its dynamic “directedness” toward, and accompanying 
homeostatic regulation of, a particular morphological end-state. 
In short then, if we conceptualise developmental systems as not being merely amenable to a 
dispositional redescription, but as genuinely realising dispositional properties, we are afforded the requisite 
ontological materials for the metaphysical foundation which the aforementioned models are built upon. 
We are afforded, in other words, an ontology capable of properly grounding the emergent and holistic 
phenomena that are central to these increasingly important models of the causal structure of 
developmental systems. This transcendental benefit is then, I suggest, a powerful advantage of adopting 
the metaphysical framework provided by an ontology of dispositions. 
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In the wake of the recent theoretical integration of the processes of organismal development with the 
principles of evolution ushered in by the empirical advances of evo-devo research, an important aim for 
the metaphysics of science must be to examine whether and to what extent various ontological 
frameworks are up to the task of modelling the data central to that research. With the rejection of the 
utility of the deductive-nomological model in the biological realm being now nearly ubiquitous, and with 
the subsequent advent of function-focused, mechanism-based models of causality, a dispositional ontology 
is a natural place to start. Indeed, as far as I‟m concerned, it is also a fine place to finish – for, as I have 
shown, the conceptual framework of that ontology is up to the aforementioned task.37 Evo-devo, it may 
be said, is a science of dispositions. 
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